The Terrorism Separatism Nexus: Contexts for Understanding What Happened in the Attack on Mali

Ihsan el-Hafidi.

Coordinated attacks recently occurred in Mali between the separatist Azawad movement on one side, and the terrorist organizations known as “Ansar al-Din” and the “Macina Movement” on the other. “Ansar al-Din” is led by Iyad Ag Ghaly and is active in Kidal in northern Mali. The “Macina Movement” is led by Amadou Kouffa and is active in the Fulani region of central Mali. These events confirm the reality of the alliance between separatism and terrorism in the Sahel. These are the very dangers to which Morocco has drawn attention in official statements within international institutions and before the African Union.

Morocco had previously warned of the substantive links between terrorism and separatism in Africa through its diplomacy. It conveyed its concerns at a ministerial meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS regarding the complicity of this alliance in undermining the stability and sovereignty of states. This alliance benefits from the complementarity of financial and operational tools in intensifying the convergence between terrorism and separatism. It also benefits from the backing of parties and states that stand behind this alliance through financing, shelter, and arms. Signs have increased of individuals moving from separatist movements into terrorist groups as a result. The Kingdom warned against this shift and called for national and regional strategies that make confronting separatism a preemptive step in combating terrorism. Security fragility and problems of sovereignty generate separatist ambitions that form financial and military supply chains for extremist groups. The ties of the Polisario Front to extremist organizations in the Sahel Sahara region are no longer the only model of this alliance between separatism and terrorism.

The scenario of a separatist terrorist attack on the state of Mali carries explanatory and indicative elements confirming the existence of this alliance. It also reveals how certain parties and states, such as Algeria, have turned separatism and terrorism in the region into instruments of geopolitical pressure on the states of the Sahel and the region as a whole. The matter has not been limited to skirmishes with Morocco. It has developed into the targeting of the Sahel ring states. These states suffer from the use of terrorism as a pressure tool against regimes and as a means of undermining their stability.

Understanding the coordinated attack between separatist and terrorist movements in Mali requires examining several analytical indicators. This analysis is necessary given the serious transformations occurring near Morocco’s vital security sphere.

First, this attack confirms that the Kingdom’s security assessments were sound. They were based on intelligence gathered from the field or derived from security coordination with the Sahel states of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. This coordination showed that the terrorism separatism nexus is an operational reality and an emerging threat.

Second, it is becoming even clearer that this nexus has become the greatest threat facing Africa. This is due to the current repercussions of the attack in Mali for Burkina Faso and Niger, and for other West African countries such as Benin and Togo. The threat reaches the Gulf of Guinea where interconnected extremist groups operate with loyalties oscillating between “al-Qaeda” and the “ISIS” organization.

Third, Algeria sponsors strong relations between extremist groups and separatist groups in the African Sahel. These groups seek to create a condition of savagery and chaos to undermine the territorial integrity of states. The Algerian military regime has employed the 2015 Algiers Accords between the Malian government and the separatist Azawad movement for this purpose. These accords left northern Mali outside the state’s security and military coverage. This encouraged the growth of extremist groups there and ultimately led them into alliance with separatism. These are the very accords whose implementation the current military government in Mali has cancelled. Mali has begun to restore control over areas outside state authority.

Fourth, Algerian media close to the military establishment began discussing an alternative to lead a transitional government in Mali immediately after the separatist terrorist attack. This occurred in the north where “Ansar al-Din” is based and in the center where the “Macina Movement” is active in military alliance with the Azawad separatist movement. The proposed alternative is Mahmoud Dicko who has been residing in Algeria since 2023. His reception by the Algerian president caused a diplomatic crisis between Algeria and Bamako. This crisis ended in the corridors of the United Nations with accusations that Algeria was supporting terrorism in Mali.

Fifth, the nomination of a controversial figure such as Mahmoud Dicko confirms that the military regime in Algeria uses separatist movements as tools of geopolitical pressure on the states of the region. This is the same method it has used for more than forty years against Morocco through the creation, financing, and arming of the separatist Polisario Front.

Sixth, the mobilization of these terrorist and separatist groups by Algeria at this moment cannot be separated from the prospect of Mali’s recognition of the Moroccan Sahara. It is tied to the consolidation of the Sahel states supporting the autonomy proposal based on Moroccan sovereignty. It also sends a misguided threat to the efforts of the UN Security Council and the United States. These entities have moved to dismantle the Tindouf camps on Algerian territory and to review the mandate of MINURSO. This aims at a final resolution of the Sahara dispute based on the autonomy proposal.

The greatest danger facing the region after the attack on Mali is that this prearranged alliance between terrorism and separatism is likely to expand under Algerian military and political sponsorship. It opens the way for the activation of extremist groups in the border triangle between Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali. It may also transfer a condition of savagery to the stable countries of West Africa if the Sahel states do not activate a collective military and security response to confront this expansion.

Part of the terrorist organizations that have today allied themselves with separatism had already announced field coordination among themselves in March 2017. This coordination involved four jihadist movements active in the African Sahel under the banner of an organization called “Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin”. The alliance included the “Sahara Emirate” of Yahya Abu al-Hammam, “Ansar al-Din” led by Ag Ghaly, “al-Mourabitoun” of the late Mokhtar Belmokhtar, and the “Macina Brigades”. This indicates that what happened in Mali has repercussions.

These repercussions reveal the existence of tactical coordination between factions belonging to both “al-Qaeda” and “ISIS” networks. This is true especially in logistics and cross border smuggling networks. This delays efforts to dismantle this structure at the security and intelligence levels.

Professor at Mohammed V University, Rabat.